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____________________________________ 
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District Judge:  Honorable Petrese B. Tucker 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
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 John Opoku appeals from an order of the District Court granting Defendants’ 
motions to dismiss his complaint.  For the reasons that follow, we will modify the District 
Court’s judgment and affirm it as modified. 
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 The facts being well-known to the parties, we set forth only those pertinent to this 
appeal.  Opoku graduated from a medical school located outside the United States.  
Around 2007, he registered for the United States Medical License Examination, which is 
administered by the Educational Commission for Foreign Medical Graduates 
(“ECFMG”).  After taking the examination and receiving failing scores, Opoku filed a 
complaint with the Pennsylvania Human Rights Commission (“PHRC”) alleging that, 
among other things, ECFMG had fabricated his testing scores and discriminated against 
him.  ECFMG moved to dismiss the complaint, and the PHRC replied on Opoku’s behalf.  
After Opoku amended his complaint, by letter dated January 23, 2012, the PHRC wrote 
to inform Opoku that it had determined that his complaint would be dismissed for lack of 
evidence.  The PHRC then denied Opoku’s request for a hearing and advised him that the 
case had been closed. 
 Thereafter, Opoku filed suit in the District Court against ECFMG; Christina Joy F. 
Grese (“Grese”), a private lawyer who represented ECFMG in proceedings before the 
PHRC; and PHRC employees Kimberly Griffin (“Griffin”) and Suzanne Martinez 
(“Martinez”).  The complaint alleged violations of Opoku’s constitutional rights under  
42 U.S.C. § 1983 and conspiracy by the Defendants to deprive him of his constitutional 
rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1985.  He also appeared to raise state law claims of intentional 
infliction of emotional distress and fraud.  The complaint sought compensatory and 
punitive damages against all Defendants as well as injunctive relief against ECFMG. 
 Defendants ECFMG and Grese filed a motion to dismiss Opoku’s complaint for 
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failure to state a claim, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  Defendants 
Griffin and Martinez filed a motion to dismiss the complaint filed a motion to dismiss the 
complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(1), and for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).  Instead of 
responding in opposition to the motions to dismiss, Opoku filed what he styled as a 
motion for summary judgment.  All Defendants opposed Opoku’s motion, and the 
District Court denied it.  At the same time, the District Court ordered Opoku to respond 
to the motions to dismiss.  Opoku filed lengthy oppositions to the motions to dismiss, and 
later filed a motion to amend his memorandum in opposition to the motion to dismiss 
filed by ECFMG and Attorney Grese.  In a succinct order entered on September 25, 2013, 
the District Court denied Opoku’s motion to amend, granted both defense motions to 
dismiss, and closed the case.  Opoku filed a timely notice of appeal.  
II. 
 We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  The standard of 
review over dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is plenary.  Gould Elecs. Inc. 
v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 176 (3d Cir. 2000).  We also exercise plenary review over 
a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  Taliaferro v. 
Darby Twp. Zoning Bd., 458 F.3d 181, 188 (3d Cir. 2006).  A District Court need not 
permit amendment of a complaint that is vulnerable to dismissal if amendment would be 
futile.  See, e.g., Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 236 (3d Cir. 2008).  We 
are of course mindful that a pro se litigant’s complaint is to be construed liberally.  See 
 4 
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972).   
 A well-pleaded complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, 
to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 
678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).  A complaint 
offering “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of 
action” does not suffice.  Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).  The plausibility 
standard requires “more than a sheer possibility” that a defendant is liable for the alleged 
misconduct.  Id.  “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will 
. . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 
experience and common sense.”  Id. at 679.    
III. 
 We affirm the dismissal of Opoku’s claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1  To 
state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege a violation of a right secured by the 
Constitution or laws of the United States committed by a person acting under color of 
state law.  West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).  Grese and ECFMG, a private not-for-
profit organization, are private parties and not state actors.  Liability would only attach if 
a private party conspired with a state actor, Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27-28 (1980).  
However, for reasons discussed later, the vague allegations of a conspiracy to deprive 
                                              
1
 As a preliminary matter, we reject Opoku’s bald assertion in his opening brief that the 
defendants fabricated certain documents that they submitted in support of their motions to 
dismiss.  Opoku raised similar allegations in his motion to amend his response to the 
Defendants’ motions to dismiss.  Given that, we perceive no error in the District Court’s 
refusal to further amend his response.  
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Opoku of his constitutional rights did not satisfy the plausibility standard of Rule 
12(b)(6).  Dismissal of Opoku’s claims against ECFMG and Grese was therefore 
appropriate. 
 We also affirm the dismissal of Opoku’s § 1983 claims against PHRC employees 
Griffin and Martinez.  The Eleventh Amendment provides a state with immunity “from 
liability for damages in a suit brought in federal court by one of its own citizens.” 
 Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 229 n.2 (1989).  This immunity extends to state 
agencies.  See MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Bell Atl. Pa., 271 F.3d 491, 503 (3d Cir. 2001).  
While states can waive their Eleventh Amendment immunity, see id., Pennsylvania has 
not done so, see 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8521(b).   The PHRC is an administrative 
commission within the executive department of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and, 
as such, it shares in the Commonwealth’s Eleventh Amendment immunity.  See 43 Pa. 
Stat. Ann. §§ 956-7.  Thus, because the PHRC was immune from suit, to the extent that 
Griffin and Martinez were sued in their official capacities, they too were immune from 
suit. 
 To the extent Griffin and Martinez were sued in their individual capacities, the 
District Court also properly dismissed Opoku’s claims against them.  According to the 
complaint, Griffin became involved in Opoku’s administrative case in June 2009, when 
she was assigned to investigate his discrimination claim against ECFMG.  Opoku alleged 
that a letter Griffin sent to him shortly after she was assigned to his case violated his 
constitutional right to counsel because she advised him that he was not required to obtain 
 6 
counsel to represent him in the PHRC proceedings.  Opoku retained counsel in any event.  
Shortly after Opoku’s attorney entered an appearance in the case, Opoku claimed that 
Griffin incorrectly advised his attorney that he had accepted a settlement offer from 
ECFMG.  Opoku also alleged that Griffin violated his constitutional rights again on 
August 17, 2009, when Griffin advised him in a letter that, on behalf of his position, the 
PHRC Office of Legal Counsel would submit a memorandum in opposition to ECFMG’s 
motion to dismiss and that Opoku’s counsel could submit a brief as well.  Griffin’s 
alleged final violation occurred on January 29, 2010, when she verified in an affidavit 
that, as a PHRC representative, she was involved in the PHRC’s investigation of Opoku’s 
charges against ECFMG and that the facts set forth in the PHRC’s memorandum in 
opposition to ECFMG’s motion to dismiss were true and correct.   
 Opoku appears to assert that Griffin’s actions violated his Fourteenth Amendment 
due process rights and his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.  To the extent that Opoku 
asserts that Griffin violated his right to counsel, the claim was not cognizable.  The 
United States Supreme Court has not recognized a constitutional right to counsel in a 
civil case or in a civil matter before an administrative agency.
2
  See Kentucky West 
Virginia Gas Co. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm’n, 837 F.2d 600, 618 (3d Cir. 1988); 
see also Parham v. Johnson, 126 F.3d 454, 456-57 (3d Cir. 1997).  To the extent Opoku 
asserts that Griffin’s role in processing his case constituted a due process violation, we 
agree with Griffin that the claim is time-barred.  Claims under section 1983 are subject to 
                                              
2
 Moreover, Opoku ultimately retained counsel to represent him in the proceedings. 
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a two-year statute of limitations.  See Garvin v. City of Phila., 354 F.3d 215, 220 (3d Cir. 
2003) (noting that there is a two-year statute of limitations for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions 
in Pennsylvania); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5524.  Opoku did not file his complaint in the 
District Court on June 19, 2012, more than two years after Griffin’s last involvement in 
handling his PHRC claim, on January 29, 2010.  Because Opoku complaint suggests that 
he was aware of Griffin’s alleged actions at the time they occurred, his §1983 claim 
accrued on the same day.  See Sameric Corp. of Del., Inc. v. City of Phila., 142 F.3d 582, 
599 (3d Cir. 1998).  Thus, the statute of limitations expired before he filed his complaint 
in the District Court, and Opoku has provided no basis for equitable tolling. 
 Opoku’s allegations against Martinez are vague and reflect that he is suing her 
merely because his administrative case was assigned to her for completion.  However, he 
does not allege that Martinez was personally involved in any constitutional violations.  
Other than his repeated claim that she engaged in a larger conspiracy against him, Opoku 
did not indicate what specific actions, if any, Martinez undertook during the PHRC 
investigation or how she violated his rights.  Because it is well-established that liability in 
a section 1983 action must be predicated upon personal involvement, see Rode v. 
Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1998), Opoku’s complaint was properly 
dismissed as to Martinez. 
 We also affirm the dismissal of Opoku’s conspiracy claim.  Opoku appeared to 
allege that the Defendants conspired against him to deprive him of his rights on account 
of his national origin.  Although Opoku made various references in his complaint to a 
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conspiracy among the Defendants to falsify his test scores and other documents, he failed 
to state, in a non-conclusory fashion, facts from which one could infer an agreement or 
understanding among the Defendants to violate his constitutional rights, or to 
discriminate against him on account of his national origin.  See D.R. by L.R. v. Middle 
Bucks Area Vocational Tech. Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1377 (3d Cir. 1992).  The mere fact 
that ECFMG ultimately prevailed before the PHRC does not suggest that the Defendants 
conspired to deprive Opoku of his rights.   
 All that remains before us are Opoku’s state law claims.  Because the District 
Court had discretion to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Opoku’s state law claims, 
see 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), and since the District Court did not issue an opinion 
providing its reasoning for declining to do so, we construe the judgment as dismissing 
Opoku’s state law claims without prejudice.  Accordingly, we will modify the District 
Court’s dismissal of those claims to reflect that its dismissal is without prejudice to 
Opoku’s ability to pursue those claims in state court.  We express no opinion on his 
likelihood of prevailing in that forum.
3
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 We are satisfied that amendment of Opoku’s complaint as to the federal claims would 
be futile, and therefore conclude that the District Court properly dismissed the complaint 
without providing leave to amend.  Phillips, 515 F.3d at 236. 
